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Introduction 
 
Egypt’s Armed Forces Cement 
Economic Power 
Military Business Expansion Impedes Structural Reforms 
Jessica Noll 
Since toppling President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, the Egyptian military has succes-
sively expanded its civil economic activities. This development has attracted growing 
criticism, above all in the private sector. The government responded in October 2016 by 
announcing that the armed forces would diminish their economic role over the coming 
two to three years. But strong market positions, established privileges and historically 
ingrained structures make it unlikely that this will actually occur. Instead the economic 
activities of the armed forces, for example in the food, energy and construction sectors, 
will continue to shape the Egyptian economy. Realisation of the structural reforms 
Cairo agreed with the IMF in November 2016 is more than doubtful under these circum-
stances. Not least on those grounds, international donors should urge Egypt’s leaders 
to curb the army’s privileges. 
 
In early September 2016 a group of Egyp-
tian mothers took to the streets of Cairo, 
protesting over a shortage of subsidised baby 
milk. While the police acted quickly to stop 
the protests spreading, the military leader-
ship addressed the problem. The armed 
forces supplied additional “discounted” for-
mula, according to an official spokesman, 
in line with its duty to poorer citizens. 
Whereas state media celebrated the in-
tervention, there were dissenting voices 
too. Especially representatives of the private 
sector, which accounts for about 65 percent 
of the total labour force (2014 figures), criti-
cised the economic influence of the armed 
forces. The increasingly broad product spec-
trum of the military enterprises – every-
thing from arms and electrical goods to 
pasta – is regarded as a competitive threat. 
Besides Prime Minister Sherif Ismail, who 
announced that the military would wind 
down its economic involvement, President 
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi also made a conciliatory 
statement, claiming that military enter-
prises represent no more than 2 percent 
of Egyptian GDP. The figure seems rather 
implausible, considering the historic role of 
the armed forces in the economy and their 
unprecedented expansion in recent years. 
Experts believe the true figure to be at least 
ten times higher, although the lack of solid 
data makes reliable estimates impossible. 
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Expansion into the Civilian 
Economy 
The economic role of the Egyptian army 
dates back to the era following the coup 
of 1952 and the subsequent presidency of 
Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956–1970), when 
the armed forces began to see themselves 
spearheading national development. Along-
side land reform, nationalisation lay at the 
heart of their policies. The old elites were 
disempowered, while the military secured 
long-term sway over land use and public 
enterprises. The doctrines of industrialisa-
tion through import substitution and devel-
opment through large-scale projects also 
originate from that era – and remain cur-
rent to this day. This centrally planned 
approach typified the construction of the 
Aswan High Dam in the 1960s and 1970s 
and the expansion of the Suez Canal in 
2014/2015. 
Nasser’s successor Anwar al-Sadat  
(1970–1981) initiated a policy of economic 
and political opening, under which the 
number of military men in high positions 
of state decreased. The peace agreement 
with Israel in 1979, which secured US mili-
tary aid for Cairo, represented another 
watershed. As well as developing Egypt’s 
defence industries, the army’s business 
activities were subsequently expanded 
under the defence ministers Abdel Halim 
Abu Ghazala (1981–1989) and Mohammed 
Tantawi (1991–2012). Here the military 
relied on a multitude of conglomerates, 
which remain to this day under the control 
of the Ministries of Defence and Military 
Production and are manged by retired 
generals. Within the military economy the 
lines between civil and military production 
are blurred. The National Service Projects 
Organisation (NSPO) founded in 1979 oper-
ates primarily in the civil sphere and con-
centrates on food production, while the 
Arab Organisation of Industrialisation 
(AOI, established 1975) and the enterprises 
of the Ministry of Military Production pro-
duce both military and civilian goods. 
Under President Hosni Mubarak (1981–
2011) Cairo pursued a course of economic 
liberalisation. From the 1990s, and above 
all in the 2000s, this led to growing com-
petition between civilian and military 
enterprises, where the latter succeeded 
in expanding both their product ranges 
and their international cooperation (for 
example with the Arab Gulf states). The 
armed forces justified this expansion above 
all on the grounds that their control over 
products and prices benefited both the 
state and consumers. 
After playing a less salient political role 
during the Mubarak years, the military 
returned to prominence after the 2011 
uprising and the toppling of Mubarak. 
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF) assumed power, and essentially re-
tained it after Mohamed Morsi was elected 
president in June 2012. As well as opening 
the way for then Defence Minister Sisi 
(Tantawi’s successor) to take over as presi-
dent, Morsi’s removal in summer 2013 also 
gave another boost to the economic expan-
sion of the armed forces. General Moham-
med al-Assar in particular has played a cen-
tral role. He had served as assistant defence 
minister under Tantawi, and was respon-
sible for external relations in SCAF from 
2011. Since President Sisi appointed Assar 
as minister of state in 2015, the Ministry of 
Military Production has been increasingly 
visibly expanding its portfolio. Most recently 
it launched a “Made in Egypt” campaign 
promoting local (military) production as a 
means to reduce import dependency. 
President Sisi also actively promotes 
reliance on the armed forces as a motor of 
national development. Under his presiden-
cy the civil economic activities of the armed 
forces have seen successive expansion at the 
expense of both the state-owned and private 
sectors. This has been possible in the first 
place because the armed forces have lever-
aged political power to further legalise their 
privileges. Military figures have also filled 
more political posts while the armed forces 
have expanded and consolidated coopera-
tion with other ministries and broadened 
their responsibilities. In order to generate 
support for their efforts, they also promote 
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their business activities much more promi-
nently than before 2011, asserting that they 
are working for the public good. Three cen-
tral sectors will be analysed in the following. 
Production and Supply of Food and 
Basic Goods 
In recent years, lack of foreign currency 
and mismanagement have regularly led to 
shortages of basic commodities, which the 
military has been able to leverage for pub-
licity and expansion of its own businesses. 
Most recently, in January 2017, the Egyp-
tian government reacted to months-long 
drug shortages and price rises for those 
that remained available by granting the 
armed forces a license to form a pharma-
ceutical company. Earlier, in November 
2016, soldiers supplied the population with 
millions of food parcels after devaluation 
of the Egyptian pound by about 130 percent 
against the US dollar caused prices to spike 
– in some cases by more than 40 percent 
in 2016 alone. Subsidised food parcels have 
repeatedly been offered whenever the sup-
ply situation tightened; many of the prod-
ucts they contained came from military 
sources. The army has also expanded its 
own supermarket chain across the country, 
in particular in order to supply those living 
below the national poverty line. According 
to official figures, that represents almost 28 
percent of the Egyptian population of more 
than 90 million. 
Supplying the population with food pro-
duced by the military is nothing new. In 
response to the so-called bread riots of 
1977, which broke out after President Sadat 
cut subsidies and were ended by the mili-
tary, the NSPO sold surplus goods to the 
civilian population. This approach has also 
been used to cushion price fluctuations in 
the international wheat markets, which 
have immediate repercussions because 
Egypt remains reliant on wheat imports. 
In 2008 President Mubarak called on the 
armed forces to tackle a particularly severe 
bread shortage by increasing production in 
military bakeries. 
The military has recently also expanded 
its political influence in the field of food 
supply. In September 2016 Major-General 
Mohammed Ali al-Sheikh took charge of the 
Ministry of Supply, which is also responsi-
ble for Egypt’s crucial wheat imports. As in 
other cases, the appointment of a military 
officer to a civilian post was presented not 
only as a service to the common good, but 
also as a means to curtail rampant corrup-
tion. The previous minister of supply faced 
– contested – accusations of corruption in 
connection with the disappearance of wheat 
stocks. And al-Sheikh’s successor, appointed 
in the February 2017 cabinet reshuffle, also 
has career-related ties to the military. 
In the course of the transition, respon-
sibility for the smart card subsidy system 
passed to the Ministry of Military Produc-
tion. Since November 2016 the influential 
Minister of State Assar has therefore also 
been responsible for the rationing system 
that permits almost 90 percent of Egyptians 
to purchase subsidised food. 
Energy 
During the years following the 2011 up-
rising Egypt was plagued by energy short-
ages. In response, a vigorous electricity 
generation expansion programme has been 
pursued. Despite reforms to facilitate pri-
vate investment, the state remains the most 
important actor – offering the armed forces 
opportunities to expand their business 
operations in the energy sector too. In 2016 
the Ministry of Military Production an-
nounced the establishment, in cooperation 
with the Ministries of Petroleum and Elec-
tricity, of a company to conduct the main-
tenance of state-owned power stations. The 
armed forces also appear to have acquired 
a veto over oil and gas production, with 
exploration and other ventures requiring 
their prior approval. The military itself also 
holds stakes in state-owned energy com-
panies, such as Tharwa Petroleum Company. 
And it is also involved as a general contrac-
tor in the expansion of coal- and gas-fired 
power stations, which is being ramped up 
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to meet rapidly rising demand. One exam-
ple of this is the conversion of two power 
stations by the Egyptian company Orascom 
in 2016. 
Military enterprises are also involved in 
the production and installation of wind 
and solar power equipment. Despite its out-
standing geographical prerequisites, renew-
able energy still plays a very marginal role 
in Egypt’s energy mix. That could well 
change, however. In July 2013 the Arab 
Organisation of Industrialisation founded 
a company to manufacture components 
for wind and solar power. And in summer 
2015, in a joint venture with an Emirati 
firm, it opened a factory producing photo-
voltaic modules. The AOI could face inter-
nal competition within the military com-
plex from the Ministry of Military Produc-
tion, which in 2016 announced plans to 
build a solar panel manufacturing plant in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Electricity 
and Renewable Energy and the Ministry of 
International Cooperation; Chinese inves-
tors are reportedly also involved. 
But above all, the military is decisively 
backing the push to bring nuclear power to 
Egypt. Despite experts’ concerns over safety 
and profitability, Sisi’s government has been 
negotiating with Russia since 2015 over 
construction of its first nuclear power. The 
armed forces were involved in talks over an 
(as yet unfinalised) agreement under which 
Russia would supply technical assistance 
and a loan of $25 billion. The military would 
also supply components. 
Construction and 
Infrastructure Projects 
Participation in major development projects 
is especially prestigious for the armed forces. 
In recent years these are likely to have gen-
erated considerable – and absolutely opaque 
– additional revenues. Since 2013 the Armed 
Forces Engineering Authority has completed 
hundreds of government projects to the 
tune of several billion Egyptian pounds: as 
well as roads and bridges, these encompass 
social housing, hospitals and slum redevel-
opment. The government is also relying on 
military participation in its ambitious plans 
to build a new capital east of Cairo by 2022. 
The largest project of recent years was 
the Suez Canal expansion. Within the space 
of just one year a second shipping lane was 
created and a stretch of the original chan-
nel was deepened. Although numerous 
civilian firms participated in the project, 
it was led by the military. The armed forces 
are also involved in developing the Suez 
Canal Economic Zone into an international 
logistics hub, including the creation of 
industrial parks and port expansions. From 
the beginning, the project has also been 
overseen by the Suez Canal Authority, which 
is usually headed by a former naval com-
mander. 
Here and in other projects, the armed 
forces have ensured that their influence 
and financial returns are not restricted to 
the construction phase. Under Article 204 
of the 2014 constitution, military facilities 
and infrastructure are subject to military 
jurisdiction, whose scope has been steadily 
expanded in recent years. For example, 
President Sisi decreed in 2016 that roads 
built by the army were security-relevant, 
along with the adjacent land. This de facto 
gave the armed forces permanent control 
of the land. The possibilities to generate 
revenue had already become obvious in 
2015, when private companies came into 
conflict with the Defence Ministry over the 
distribution of advertising revenues from 
hoardings installed beside the Cairo Ring 
Road on land claimed by the armed forces. 
Sisi’s decree could also secure the military 
lucrative locations for its petrol stations. 
Political Calculations 
In general the expansion of the military 
economy can be regarded as an ongoing 
strategy to justify the size of the army. Given 
that economically hard-pressed Egypt faces 
no acute external threats, it is hard to jus-
tify maintaining the world’s tenth-largest 
army with a strength of about 440,000. The 
armed forces’ economic activities are there-
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fore presented in the context of “national 
security”. Given that popular unrest, for 
example in response to shortages, certainly 
has the potential to turn against it, the 
military has good reason to worry about 
internal security and an interest of its own 
in providing affordable everyday needs 
such as food and electricity. 
Expanding its business operations also 
offers the military possibilities to strengthen 
its control over the population. Via the 
smart card system for subsidised food, 
whose data is now gathered by the Ministry 
of Military Production, the armed forces 
can ultimately decide who is to receive sub-
sidies. In recent years, moreover, the legal 
possibilities for prosecuting civilians before 
military tribunals have been expanded. 
These now have the authority to prosecute 
any violation touching on to the military or 
its facilities. In future this could also apply 
to offences relating to smart cards for sub-
sidised food. 
Intensified cooperation between the 
army and the private sector also creates 
structures of dependency. It has become 
harder for private companies to win public 
contracts, as they can be underbid by the 
expanding military enterprises. If they want 
to survive economically, firms are increas-
ingly forced to cooperate with the armed 
forces, with the latter clearly in the driving 
seat. 
Economic Self-interest 
As has been the case in the past, military 
actors justify their business activities on 
the basis of supposed benefits to society as 
a whole – for example asserting that low 
prices for their products and projects ben-
efit both the population and the state bud-
get. Ultimately, however, they are likely 
pursuing their own economic interests. It is 
impossible to make any serious estimate of 
their profit margins, or judge whether the 
low prices actually benefit the state budget. 
Given that such prices are only possible 
because of extensive privileges, this repre-
sents an extreme distortion of competition. 
For example, the armed forces are able 
to draw on recruits for cheap labour. No 
reliable figures exist for the numbers of 
conscripts working in the army’s factories, 
nor what they earn. But one indication of 
low wage costs is found in a decree issued 
in summer 2013, increasing monthly pay 
for recruits to about 250 Egyptian pounds 
(about $36 at the 2013 exchange rate). 
Control of construction land must also 
generate substantial profits. A law of 1981 
grants the Defence Ministry authority to 
designate state-owned desert land for con-
struction projects. Other ministries and 
agencies also share this task, but enjoy 
lesser status than the Defence Ministry or 
are required to coordinate with it – as in 
the case of the National Centre for Planning 
State Land Uses. In 1997 then President 
Mubarak also decreed that the armed forces 
may administer undeveloped non-agricul-
tural land. As a result, investors planning 
projects such as solar and wind power re-
quire additional permits from the military. 
Fiscal exemptions represent yet another 
competitive advantage. Military enterprises 
pay no income, sales or import taxes. In 
June 2015, Defence Minister Sedki Sobhi 
also exempted numerous military-owned 
properties – including hotels and super-
markets, as well as housing – from property 
tax. Concurrently, in 2016 a 13 percent value-
added tax was imposed on transactions in 
the civilian sector, and at the same time the 
import tax on hundreds of products was in-
creased, in some cases by up to 60 percent. 
Across the board the army’s revenues are 
likely boosted by its ability to cover most of 
its running costs out of the defence budget. 
Neither parliament nor the public is in-
formed in any detail about how the defence 
budget breaks down. According to news-
paper reports, it increased by $1 billion 
between fiscal years 2013/2014 and 2015/ 
2016, to reach $5.4 billion – despite the 
country’s financial troubles. This further 
underlines the political power of the mili-
tary. 
Moreover, annual US military aid of $1.3 
billion is estimated to cover up to 80 per-
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cent of Egyptian weapons procurement. 
This has allowed the military to accumulate 
immense financial reserves over the decades. 
Sources close to the army put the sums in-
volved in the low tens of billions. Such 
assumptions are not unrealistic, given that 
the armed forces lent the Egyptian central 
bank $1 billion in 2011. 
No Civilian Controls 
Historically, there has always been a lack of 
civilian control over the military enterprises. 
Since 2011 that situation has increasingly 
been codified in law. First and foremost, the 
constitution of 2014 stipulates that only the 
National Defence Council – whose members 
are largely military – may debate the defence 
budget. 
This means that the parliament elected 
at the end of 2015 lacks any constitutional 
authority to operate as an instance of con-
trol. Moreover, for the first time in decades, 
parliament again includes numerous mem-
bers whose background is in the security 
apparatus. For example, the chair of the 
Defence and National Security Committee 
comes from the military intelligence ser-
vice. In this function he participates in 
sessions of the National Defence Council 
discussing budget matters. Thus, another 
channel for civilian oversight is closed. At 
the same time, despite the fragmented party 
landscape, pro-regime forces secured a 
majority in parliament, which has passed 
pro-army legislation. For example, military 
pensions were raised in 2016, after they 
had already been increased repeatedly since 
2014. 
Neither the judiciary nor other civilian 
organs possess the authority to investigate 
transgressions committed by the military. 
At the latest since 2011 serving and retired 
military personnel have been immune from 
prosecution in the civilian justice system, 
and may only be tried by military tribunals. 
This protection also applies to the business 
activities of military actors, which on ac-
count of their classification as “security-
relevant” are already completely opaque 
and encourage mismanagement, if not 
even corruption. The Administrative Con-
trol Authority, which is officially respon-
sible for fighting corruption in the adminis-
tration, is itself traditionally headed by a 
former army officer. 
In fact, given that members of the armed 
forces also enjoy exclusive access to lucrative 
posts in the administration and various 
state authorities, they actually control the 
civil sphere, rather than vice versa. For dec-
ades, former officers have occupied gover-
norships and top administrative posts, for 
example in the aforementioned Suez Canal 
Authority and the port and transport author-
ities. The number of such functionaries 
with military backgrounds has increased 
yet further since President Sisi took office. 
The fact that there is no significant dis-
cernible resistance to the army’s activities 
underlines its predominance in the state’s 
institutional structures. Egyptian civil 
society is powerless to change that. NGOs 
seeking to improve transparency and rule 
of law have been systematically persecuted 
and impeded in their work since Sisi took 
office. Nor can the media offer any correc-
tion. Freedom of the press is heavily cur-
tailed, and critical reporting on the mili-
tary subject to state censorship. 
Outlook and Recommendations 
Despite the government’s insistence that 
the military is doing no more than crisis 
management, the armed forces are unlikely 
to withdraw from the Egyptian economy in 
the foreseeable future. Examples like China 
and Argentina demonstrate that pruning 
back military involvement in business 
demands political willpower. President Sisi 
will continue to support his generals’ course 
of business expansion because he is heavily 
reliant on their backing due to a lack of 
democratic legitimacy. 
In fact, the influence of the armed forces 
in the Egyptian economy could increase 
further, contrary to the interests of inter-
national donors. In November 2016 Cairo 
agreed a comprehensive economic package 
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with the IMF, in the context of a budget 
deficit of 12.1 percent and state debt reach-
ing almost 100 percent of GDP in fiscal year 
2015/2016. An IMF loan of $12 billion and 
funds from other donors including Germany 
are designed to create space for reforms in 
the coming years and thus boost economic 
growth. The goals include increasing com-
petition and improving the climate for in-
vestors – and hence also strengthening the 
private sector. 
Yet the economic expansionism of the 
armed forces threatens to keep Egypt’s pub-
lic sector contribution to GDP at its existing 
level, if not to increase it. Other planned 
reforms are also at risk: the IMF programme 
seeks to liberalise the energy market, but 
military interests in this sector (described 
above) are likely to hamper implementa-
tion. Efforts to create new jobs could also be 
undermined, along with hopes of promot-
ing the private sector by reducing bureau-
cracy, new investment legislation, more 
transparent allocation of land and greater 
competition. Given that the armed forces 
draw primarily on their own personnel to 
realise their projects, wide-ranging military 
business activities will not necessarily 
create the new jobs the country urgently 
needs, with official unemployment at 27 
percent among the under-30s. Moreover a 
reduction in military-related bureaucracy 
cannot be expected in the coming years. 
Complicated military approval processes 
will continue to create costly delays in pri-
vate investment projects. And the appoint-
ment of military officers to political offices 
is unlikely to contribute to reducing cor-
ruption or improving transparency, as 
demanded by international donors. 
The options for external donors to bring 
about a reduction in the economic power 
of the Egyptian military appear limited. But 
that does not mean that the matter should 
be ignored. Even if donors make their aid 
conditional, the army cannot be expected 
to withdraw completely from the Egyptian 
economy. However, in talks over financial 
aid they should still demand at least a 
reduction in the economic activities and 
privileges of the Egyptian armed forces. 
Otherwise support designed to encourage 
economic development will be fruitless. 
Germany and the European Union should 
also put more thought into ways to assist 
the few civil society actors in Egypt, which 
could potentially initiate a national discus-
sion about civil-military relations and push 
for a shift towards greater transparency. 
The current climate of repression of critical 
civil society makes this extremely difficult. 
Especially in that context, concessions to 
the Egyptian armed forces should only be 
made when they in return contribute to im-
proving the human rights situation and the 
treatment of civil society. 
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